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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a breach of oral contract over the initial sum of $6,800. Plaintiff Michelle 
Campbell ("Campbell") is an excellent nurse and Defendant Parkway Surgery Center, LLC 
("Parkway") wanted her to join its team when it opened its doors for business. Parkway's prior 
Administrator/Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), Arthur McCracken ("McCracken") and Director of 
Nursing, Nanette Hirschi ("Hirschi"), both of whom helped recruit Campbell on behalf of Parkway, 
testified Parkway agreed to pay Campbell's Forgivable Loan Agreement ( the "Loan") with Bingham 
Memorial Hospital ("BMH") Foundation ("BMH Foundation"), which would become due if 
Campbell left her employment with BMH. 
In spite of the agreement confirmed by its own employees, Parkway has repeatedly refused 
to pay Campbell's Loan to the BMH Foundation. After lengthy discovery, numerous motions, a 
bench trial, a ruling that Parkway breached its oral agreement with Campbell, a motion for 
reconsideration affirming that Parkway breached its oral agreement, and an appeal to the District 
Court again affirming Parkway's breach, Parkway continues to raise any argument it can to avoid 
its obligation. The District Court's careful consideration of the evidence and its thorough analysis 
of the legal authority should be affirmed. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In June 2002, Campbell entered into a Loan with the BMH Foundation, which required 
Campbell to work for BMH for a set period of time in consideration for payment of $6,800.00 
toward Campbell's tuition for her nursing program. (Tr., p. 20, L. 20-p. 25, L. 5; PL Ex. A). The 
Loan, dated June 25, 2002, provided that the Loan would be incrementally forgiven if Campbell 
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worked for BMH for the period of time specified after obtaining her registered nurse ("RN") degree. 
(PL Ex. A). In the Loan, Campbell agreed that if she did not work for BMH as agreed, she would 
reimburse the BMH Foundation for the $6,800.00 tuition payment, plus interest. (PL Ex. A). 
In approximately April of 2003, while Campbell was employed by BMH, Hirschi, Director 
of Nursing for Parkway, approached Campbell to recruit her for a nursing position with Parkway. 
(Tr., p. 25, L. 6-p. 26, L. 8; p. 120, L.7-L. 11). Campbell indicated that she was interested but that 
in order for her to leave BMH to work for Parkway, the Loan would have to be paid. (Tr., p. 25, L. 
6 - p. 26, L. 8; p. 120, L.7 - p. 121, L. 10). At the time, Parkway had just been organized, and the 
board was working to set up facilities and hire nurses and other staff members. (Tr., p. 117, L. 14 -
p. 119, L. 3). Hirschi had previously been Campbell's supervisor at BMH prior to becoming 
Director of Nursing for Parkway, and, therefore, knew of Campbell's capabilities as a nurse and 
believed Campbell would be a valuable asset for Parkway to have on staff. (Tr., p. 113, L. 16-25). 
Campbell also had worked with Parkway's owners, Dr. Robert Lee ("Lee"), Dr. Bret Rogers 
("Rogers"), and Dr. Christopher Riley ("Riley"), while she was at BMH. (Tr., p. 122, L. 11-16). 
Based upon their prior experiences with Campbell, Lee, Rogers and Riley all knew Campbell was 
an excellent nurse and wanted her on Parkway's staff. (Tr., p. 122, L. 11-16). 
Prior to recruiting Campbell, Parkway was aware of Campbell's obligation under the Loan 
because Hirschi had assisted Campbell in obtaining the Loan with the BMH Foundation while she 
was still employed at BMH as Campbell's supervisor. (Tr., p. 114, L. 12 - p. 115, L. 17). 
Consequently, when Parkway's board began discussing recruiting Campbell, Hirschi explained 
Campbell's Loan and informed Parkway's board that if they wanted to have Campbell work for 
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Parkway, they would need to pay the amounts due under the Loan for Campbell, because working 
for Parkway would necessitate leaving BMH prior to Campbell being able to fulfill the requirements 
for the Loan to be forgiven. (Tr., p. 122, L. 8 - p. 123, L. 8). Hirschi was aware of the amount of the 
Loan and provided that information to the board. (Tr., p. 123, L. 5-8). 
A board member commented at the board meeting that, if they recruited Campbell, they may 
not have to pay off the Loan because he thought BMH may not attempt to collect from Campbell if 
the Loan was not paid. (Tr., p. 123, L. 11-20; p. 141, L. 13-19). Hirschi responded that if Parkway 
were to recruit Campbell by promising to pay off her Loan to BMH, then they would need to actually 
pay off the Loan as promised. (Tr., p. 123, L. 11-20; p. 141, L. 13-19). The board discussed the 
issue further and they agreed that paying Campbell's Loan was necessary to recruit Campbell to 
work as a nurse for Parkway. (Tr., p. 124, L. 5-11; p. 144, L. 2-21). McCracken, Parkway's 
Administrator/CFO at the time, was also present at the board meeting when the terms of recruitment 
of Campbell were discussed and the direction was given to recruit Campbell and pay off her Loan. 
(Tr., p. 121, L. 20-24; p. 164, L. 14-21; p. 181, L. 25 - p. 182, L. 9). 
As a result of the board's decision to recruit Campbell, in early May 2003, McCracken and 
Hirschi held a joint interview with Campbell and Robin Chadburn, another potential employee of 
Parkway. (Tr., p. 125, L. 7-16). During the interview, McCracken and Hirschi brought up the issue 
ofCampbell'sLoan. (Tr.,p.27,L.3-23;p.126,L.1-4;p.131,L.3-7;p.167,L.22-p.168,L.6). 
Campbell explained that the loan was for $6,800. (Tr., p. 28, L. 3-15). McCracken stated that 
Parkway would take care of the Loan for Campbell if she would come work for Parkway, and asked 
Campbell to bring in the promissory note so Parkway could pay the debt. (Tr., p. 27, L. 3 - p. 28, 
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L. 15; p. 167, L. 22-p. 168, L. 10). Both Hirschi and McCracken testified that "taking care of' the 
Loan meant Parkway would pay it. (Tr., p. 137, L. 10-22; p. 182, L. 3-9). Aside from Campbell 
quitting her job at BMH and coming to work for Parkway, no other conditions were attached to 
Parkway paying off the Loan for Campbell. (Tr., p. 27, L. 13-23; p. 89, L. 5-10; p. 166, L. 2-8; PL 
Ex. D). Subsequent to accepting Parkway's offer of employment, and based upon Parkway's 
promise to pay off her Loan to the BMH Foundation, Campbell resigned from BMH and began 
working for Parkway. Campbell gave a copy of the promissory note and Loan to Parkway. (Tr., p. 
27, L. 16-19; p. 168, L. 7-12). After starting employment at Parkway on May 27, 2003, Campbell 
wrote a thank you note to Parkway's board, thanking Parkway for taking care of her Loan with the 
BMH Foundation and for the opportunity to work at Parkway. (Tr., p. 30, L. 7-14; p. 168, L. 22 -
p. 169, L. 9). Both the thank you note and promissory note were given to Dave Collette ("Collette"), 
who was Parkway's manager at the time. (Tr., p. 30, L.7-14; p. 169, L. 2-4). After giving the thank 
you note and promissory note to Parkway, no one from Parkway ever approached Campbell to ask 
her why she would be thanking them for paying off her Loan or to tell her that she was mistaken that 
Parkway had agreed to pay off her debt to the BMH Foundation. (Tr., p. 30, L. 15-21). Campbell 
understood that subsequent to her beginning work at Parkway that Parkway paid off the Loan as 
agreed. (Tr., p. 30, L. 22-25). McCracken and Hirschi also understood that Parkway had paid the 
Loan as promised. (Tr. p. 127, L. 2-8; p. 172, L. 17 - p. 173, L. 5). 
Unbeknownst to Campbell, Parkway did not pay off the Loan with the BMH Foundation as 
promised. Campbell did not learn that Parkway failed to pay off the Loan until February of 2005, 
when she received a telephone call from BMH asking her to repay the Loan because she was in 
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default. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-23). Campbell was surprised by this call, as she understood that Parkway 
had previously paid offher Loan. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-25; p. 47, L. 2-4). Campbell approached Hirschi 
about the non-payment of the Loan. (Tr., p. 37, L. 17-20). Hirschi was shocked that the Loan had 
not been paid, as she had also understood it had been paid. (Tr., p. 127, L. 9-16). Campbell and 
Hirschi spoke to McCracken about the Loan payment, who also understood it had been paid, and 
with Dr. Steve Klippert ("Klippert"), who was Parkway's Administrator at the time. (Tr., p. 37, L. 
20-24; p. 173, L. 9-24). Klippert said he would look into the matter. Klippert later informed 
Campbell that Parkway had never paid off the Loan to the BMH Foundation. (Tr., p. 38, L. 3-5). 
In March 2005, shortly after Campbell received the telephone call from the BMH Foundation 
informing her that she was in default and that she needed to pay the Loan back, Parkway was looking 
to reduce expenses and had informed its staff that it would be cutting hours and benefits. (Tr., p. 35, 
L. 16 - p. 36, L. 20). Hirschi resigned as Director of Nursing. (Tr., p. 38, L. 20). Campbell also 
informed Parkway that she intended to resign. (Tr., p. 36, L. 13 - p. 42, L. 12). Campbell received 
a telephone call from Rogers after Hirschi resigned, at which time he offered Campbell the position 
of interim Director of Nursing, with the promise that she could apply for the Director of Nursing 
position. (Tr., p. 38, L. 19-22). Campbell expressed reservations about taking the position because, 
at the time, she had only had her RN license for one week. (Tr., p. 38, L. 23 - p. 39, L. 1). Then 
Campbell asked Rogers, "What about my loan?" Rogers responded that "maybe" Parkway would 
pay off Campbell's Loan ''this time" if she would accept the position she was being offered. (Tr., 
p. 39, L. 2-4; p. 42, L. 6-9). Ultimately, Campbell opted not to accept the interim Director of 
Nursing position and resigned from Parkway in early March 2005. (Tr., p. 42, L. 10-12). Campbell 
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sent a demand letter to Parkway from counsel, requesting that Parkway fulfill its promise. (Aug. R., 
Aff. ofDeAnne Casperson, Ex. B). Parkway never paid off her Loan to the BMH Foundation and 
Campbell was forced to bring suit against Parkway in 2005. (R., p. 15-21). 
The matter was tried before the honorable Robert C. Brower, Magistrate. The Magistrate 
Court found in favor of Campbell on her breach of contract claim, against Parkway on its 
counterclaim and cross-claim, and determined that Campbell was entitled to attorney's fees and costs 
as the prevailing party. (R., p. 87-88). 
The Magistrate Court ordered the following relating to the breach of contract: 
3. That the Defendant, Parkway Surgical Center, LLC, is hereby ordered to pay 
the amount of $6,800.00 plus any accumulated interest due by Ms. Campbell 
on the Forgivable Loan Agreement with "Foundation." This payment shall 
be made directly to Ms. Campbell, it being assumed that Ms. Campbell will 
tender that amount to "Foundation" to extinguish her obligation with them 
and to thus rehabilitate her reputation in the local medical community. 
(R., p. 89). Parkway appealed to the District Court. The District Court affirmed the breach of 
contract claim but remanded to reform the judgment, finding that Campbell was entitled to specific 
performance as was pied in the Second Amended Complaint. (R., p. 237). The District Court also 
granted Campbell's attorney's fees and costs on appeal. (R., p. 249). On May 28, 2014, Parkway 
appealed the decision of the District Court. (R., p. 281). After two 35-day extensions of time, 
Parkway filed its Appellant's Brief untimely. 1 
1 Parkway was ordered by this Court to file its brief"on or before 12-4-2014." Parkway filed 
its brief on December 5, 2014. Failure to timely file a brief "may be grounds only for such action or 
sanction as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal." 
I.A.R. 21. As a result, it is within the discretion of this Court whether Parkway should be sanctioned 
in some manner for its untimely filing. 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court's review of the District Court's decision in its capacity as an appellate court has 
been clearly set forth as follows: 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether 
there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of 
fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If 
those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the 
district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's 
decision as a matter of procedure. 
Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 
Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008)). This Court does not review the Magistrate Court's 
decisions. Id This Court is "procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district 
court." Id (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413 n.1, 224 P.3d 480,482 n.l (2009)). 
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent includes the following additional issues on appeal: 
1. As an alternative basis for affirming the District Court, is Campbell entitled to a damage 
award as a result of her economic interest in Parkway's promise to pay off her Forgivable 
Loan Agreement? 
2. Is Campbell entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal? 
V. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Campbell is entitled to attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules, Idaho Code §§ 12-120(1), and 12-120(3) in defending Campbell in this appeal. The 
Magistrate Court has already determined that Campbell is the prevailing party as against Parkway 
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in its Judgment issued on August 14, 2012, (R., p. 92 ) and granted Campbell her attorney's fees and 
costs in its Amended Judgment on November 14, 2012. (R., p. 297). The District Court affirmed 
the decision by the Magistrate Court and granted attorney's fees and costs on appeal. (R., p. 297). 
Campbell has set forth further argument in support of her claims for fees and costs in Section VI, E. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. CAMPBELL HAS STANDING 
1. Parkway Was Required to Present its Standing Argument to the District Court. 
For the first time, Parkway claims in its opening brief that Campbell lacks standing to bring 
her breach of contract claim. Generally, a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised for 
the first time on appeal. See Blankenship v. Wash. Trust Bank, 153 Idaho 292, 295, 281 P .3d 1070, 
1073 (2012). However, this is not Parkway's first appeal, but its second. Under the standard of 
review, this Court sits as a reviewing Court over the District Court's appellate decision. See Bailey 
v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012). As a result, this Court is "procedurally 
bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court." Id. ( quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 
413,415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480,482 n.1 (2009)). As a result of the procedural restrictions as a second-
level appellate reviewing Court, Parkway was required to raise its standing argument to the District 
Court to preserve it. As a result, the claim should be dismissed. 
2. Parkway Should Be Estopped from Contesting Campbell's Standing When it 
Sought the Jurisdiction of the Court on its Counterclaim and Cross-Claim. 
Parkway's actions prevent it from asserting that Campbell lacked standing. First, a motion 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) is the avenue for contesting the lack of subject matter 
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jurisdiction. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b). Parkway never brought a motion to dismiss contesting 
Campbell's standing. Second, in its Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, Parkway failed to 
include as an affirmative defense that Campbell lacked standing. (R., p. 68) A failure to assert an 
affirmative defense before trial is generally a bar to raising the issue at a later time. See Guzman v. 
Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 935, 318 P.3d 918, 925 (2013). Third, Parkway asserted a counterclaim 
against Campbell, admitting that it did have an agreement with Campbell for the repayment of the 
Loan, but under different terms than those asserted by Campbell. (R., p. 69-72). In addition, 
Parkway asserted a cross-claim against McCracken, claiming he did not have authority to offer 
Campbell payment of the Loan. (R., p. 34-35). After losing on its counterclaim and its cross-claim 
(R., p. 88-89), Parkway now seeks to contest the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Parkway cannot contest the jurisdiction of the Court when it is the defendant, and seek the 
jurisdiction of the Court when it is the plaintiff - all on the basis of a contractual agreement 
associated with the repayment of Campbell's Loan. Understandably, Campbell cannot find a single 
case where a defendant has both contested standing of the plaintiff in a breach of contract action, and 
asserted a counterclaim, admitting that an agreement existed but that the terms were different. 
Parkway seeks to take inconsistent positions to suit its purposes in the litigation. It certainly 
understood the Magistrate Court had subject matter jurisdiction when it counterclaimed against 
Campbell and cross-claimed against McCracken. The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents Parkway 
from contesting the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Court. "Judicial estoppel, sometimes also known 
as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a party from gaining an advantage 
by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position." 
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Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492,502 (2004) (quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers and 
Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597,600 (9th Cir.1996)). As quoted fromRissetto in Sword by this 
Court, "[t]he policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general considerations of 
the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings .... Judicial 
estoppel is intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts .... Because it 
is intended to protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court 
at its discretion." Id Parkway's argument that Campbell did not have standing when it admitted 
it had a contractual agreement with her and filed a counterclaim and cross-claim, should be 
disregarded by this Court. 
3. As a Party to the Agreement, Campbell Has Standing. 
Campbell, as a party to the contract with Parkway, has standing to bring this action to contest 
Parkway's breach of contract by its failure to pay Campbell's debt to the BMH Foundation. In its 
efforts to contest a straightforward breach of contract claim, Parkway asserts Campbell has no 
standing, claiming that Campbell suffered no injury from Parkway's refusal to pay a debt she 
incurred only as a result of leaving her employment with BMH to work for Parkway. Most 
disturbing is Parkway's claim that the District Court on appeal ruled that Campbell was not injured. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 13 ("The District Court agreed with this legal mandate and found that 
Campbell had not been injured.")). The District Court's first conclusion oflaw was as follows: "l. 
Campbell sustained an injury recoverable under contract law." (R., p. 251). The District Court 
specifically found that Parkway was liable for the breach of contract and the remedy was specific 
performance: "Regardless of whether the applicable statute oflimitations now bars the Foundation 
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from suing Campbell on the Forgivable Loan Agreement, Parkway's promise to 'take care of' 
Campbell's debt created an enforceable duty which may be remedied by specific performance." (R., 
p. 236). Parkway essentially argues that unless Campbell actually paid off the Loan and incurred 
out-of-pocket money damages, she has no standing. Parkway simply ignores the evidence that 
Campbell altered her position as a result of Parkway's promise by leaving BMH, which caused her 
to incur a repayment obligation of the Loan. 
Parkway disregards its contractual relationship with Campbell in its standing analysis, and 
instead, claims Campbell has no injury, confusing the injury necessary for standing with the 
obligation of proving damages as an element of a claim of breach of contract. "When an issue of 
standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but upon the party who is 
seeking relief. Indeed, a party can have standing to bring an action, but then lose on the merits." 
Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 806, 808, 241 P.3d 979, 981 (2010). Further, Campbell's 
demonstration of a breach of contract would entitle her to nominal damages, even if she could not 
recover the amount of the Loan or was not entitled to specific performance. See Davis v. Gage, 106 
Idaho 735,739,682 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS,§ 305, cmt. 
a. 
"To satisfy the requirement of standing, a litigant must allege an injury in fact, a fairly 
traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct, and a substantial 
likelihood that the judicial reliefrequested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Troutner v. 
Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006). Campbell has both pled and proven 
that she has been injured by Parkway's breach of contract. Campbell has consistently alleged that 
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Parkway injured her by inducing her to leave her employment with BMH with its promise that 
Parkway would pay her debt to the Foundation- a debt that would not have arisen if Campbell had 
stayed employed with BMH. Both the Magistrate Court and District Court agreed that Parkway 
breached the agreement and Campbell was injured thereby. In her Second Amended Complaint, 
Campbell set forth the terms of her agreement with Parkway, Parkway's breach by its failure and 
refusal upon demand to pay the debt incurred, and the injury caused to her in incurring a debt. (R., 
p. 54-64). In her prayer for relief, Campbell asked for "a declaratory judgment ordering Defendant 
to pay to Bingham Memorial the principal amount of$6,800.00 plus interest to be determined upon 
judgment, or in the alternative, for a money judgment in the principal amount of$6,800.00 plus an 
award of interest in an amount to be determined upon judgment." (R., p. 61). Based on the 
pleadings, Campbell has clearly demonstrated privity of contract with Parkway and has alleged an 
injury as a result of the breach necessary to establish standing. 
Parkway can only make its argument that a person in privity of contract with the opposing 
party has no standing to assert a breach of contract claim by ignoring Idaho Supreme Court authority 
on standing in the context of a party to a contract. Parkway has not cited to a single case wherein 
a party to a contract at issue in the lawsuit did not have standing. Idaho Supreme Court authority has 
made it very clear who has standing to enforce the terms of a contract: 
It is axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a 
contract. "Privity" refers to "those who exchange the [ contractual] promissory words 
or those to whom the promissory words are directed. Calemari and Perillo, Contracts 
§ 17-1 (2d ed. 1977); see generally 4 Corbin on Contracts § 778 (1951 ). Here, 
plaintiffs-appellants are not parties to the prior lease between Montierth and San Tan, 
and hence they have no privity and cannot sue to enforce the terms of that prior 
contract. A party must look to that person with whom he is in a direct 
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contractual relationship for relief, in the event that his expectations under the 
contract are not met. Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 45, 539 P .2d 590, 597 (1975); 
Minidoka County v. Krieger, 88 Idaho 395, 399 P.2d 962 (1965); Coburn v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 86 Idaho 415,387 P.2d 598 (1963). 
Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984) (emphasis added). Campbell 
brought this action against Parkway, the very party that promised to pay her Loan with the BMH 
Foundation in exchange for her agreement to end her employment with BMH and work for Parkway. 
In spite of Campbell's privity of contract with Parkway, it argues that the cause of action actually 
belongs to the BMH Foundation and not to Campbell. Although the BMH Foundation may have 
been able to enforce the agreement as a third-party beneficiary, Campbell still has standing to enforce 
the agreement made for her benefit. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 305 makes it 
clear Campbell, as the promisee, has a right to enforce the agreement: "(l) A promise in contract 
creates a duty in the promisor to the promisee to perform the promise even though he also has a 
similar duty to an intended beneficiary." Further,§ 307 directly indicates that "either the promisee 
or the beneficiary may maintain a suit for specific performance of a duty owed to an intended 
beneficiary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,§ 307. 
Instead of citing the straightforward cases that make it clear a party to a contract can sue to 
enforce its own agreement, Parkway cites to State v. Doe, a case in which a minor sought standing 
to contest the constitutionality of a statute on the grounds that it infringed upon his parents' rights. 
148 Idaho 919, 936, 231 P .3d 1016, 103 3 (2010). State v. Doe has no applicability to Campbell's 
situation. Parkway also cites to Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738-39, 274 P.3d 1249, 
1254 (2012), in which a former employee sought reinstatement for himself, and for three other 
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employees who were not parties to the action. See id This Court rejected that standing existed for 
the three employees not a party to the action. See id. Parkway compares this case to Campbell, 
attempting to claim that she is in the same position as one of the three other employees. Again, 
Parkway ignores that Campbell is a party to the contract, making these other cases completely 
inapplicable. Parkway's promise to pay Campbell's Loan in order to obtain her as its employee was 
a promise made to and for the benefit of Campbell. Campbell's lawsuit to force Parkway to do 
exactly as it promised is not "judicial vigilantism" as asserted by Parkway (Appellant's Brief, p. 17), 
but Campbell's longstanding effort to force Parkway to honor its promise. As a party to the 
agreement, Campbell has standing to compel Parkway to perform its obligation under the agreement. 
B. PARKWAY'S ARGUMENT THAT IT TOOK CARE OF THE LOAN BY DOING 
NOTHING WAS REJECTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT, AND THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
In this appeal, Parkway again argues that there was never any agreement that Parkway would 
actually pay off Campbell's debt to the BMH Foundation, but that it could deal with the debt 
however it wanted, including "paying the amount immediately, paying the obligation in installment 
payments, negotiating a compromise settlement of the obligation, off-setting the amount against 
another debt, or simply waiting to see if BMH elected to pursue an action under its contract." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 23). Not only did Parkway present no evidence that this was the case, 
Parkway's assertion is yet another example of Parkway's shifting attempts to avoid its obligation to 
Campbell. Parkway's first position is this case was that the agreement with Campbell was that 
Parkway stepped into the shoes of BMH, meaning that Campbell had to work for Parkway for a 
specific amount oftime in order for Parkway to repay Campbell's debt to the BMH Foundation. (R., 
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p. 30). When Parkway realized it had no evidence to support that position, Parkway then switched 
its stance. Having been unsuccessful with that argument, on appeal to the District Court, Parkway 
argued, as it does now, that it could "take care of' the debt however it wanted. (R., p. 142 and 
Appellant's Brief, p. 23). Parkway's shifting position with regard to the terms of the agreement 
further bolster the Magistrate Court's finding of fact, supported by substantial, competent evidence 
in the record, that, consistent with Campbell's position throughout this case, the agreement between 
Campbell and Parkway was that if Campbell came to work for Parkway, Parkway would pay off the 
debt incurred by Campbell by leaving BMH. Moreover, Parkway's argument ignores the applicable 
standard of review, asking this Court to overturn the Magistrate Court's determination, based upon 
the evidence presented at trial, that Parkway agreed to repay Campbell's loan to the BMH 
Foundation in exchange for Campbell coming to work for Parkway. (R., p. 87-88). This Court does 
not review the decision of the Magistrate Court, but the decision by the District Court. See Bailey 
v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012). 
Parkway completely sidesteps this standard, and instead invites this Court to second guess 
the Magistrate Court's findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, raising evidence it claims is contrary 
to the Magistrate Court's determination. Of course, in doing so, Parkway, ignores the substantial, 
competent evidence presented by Campbell at trial, which contradicts Parkway's theory of the case. 
Campbell presented testimony upon which the Magistrate Court based its decision, indicating that 
Parkway understood and agreed that "taking care of' the loan meant paying the loan off for 
Campbell. Hirschi, who was Director of Nursing, an officer position, at the time Parkway entered 














So was the decision made at that meeting to hire Ms. 
Campbell? 
Yes, it was. 
And to pay off her loan for her? 
(Nonverbal answer.) 
Can you verbalize that? 
Yes. 
*** 
And how was it stated in her interview? 
That Parkway would take care of her obligation. 
Okay. When you say "take care of it," does that mean - -
Parkway would pay. 
(Tr., p. 124, L. 5-11; p. 138, L. 17-22). Likewise, McCracken, Administrator/CFO for Parkway at 
the time, testified: 
(Mr. Sorensen) Q. 
(McCracken) A. 
Okay. And as far as you knew, the board hadn't 
authorized you to say "We're going to give you $6,800 if 
you come work for us?" 
No. That wasn't the authorization at all. It was 
authorization to extend employment under the agreement 
that they would take care of her obligation. 
Q. Okay. By taking care of the obligation, do you mean that 
if the obligation-if there did exist an obligation, it would 
be paid by Parkway? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p. 181, L. 25 - p. 182, L. 9). The letters that Hirschi and McCracken wrote on behalf of 
Campbell when Parkway refused to pay off Campbell's debt after BMH contacted Campbell about 
the nonpayment of the debt also demonstrates that Parkway agreed to actually pay off Campbell's 
debt. (Tr., p. 138, L. 19, Ex. D; p. 171, L. 11, Ex. F). Campbell's testimony likewise indicates that 
the agreement was that Parkway actually pay Campbell's debt which was incurred as a result of her 
leaving BMH to work for Parkway. (Tr., p. 27, L. 3 - p. 28, L. 19). The testimony from Parkway's 
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own agents constitutes more than substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the 
Magistrate Court's decision and the District Court's decision affirming the Magistrate Court. 
Unbelievably, Parkway cites to testimony from its board meetings, demonstrating Parkway 
was already considering how it could avoid making the payment it authorized and agreed to pay on 
Campbell's behalf, and additionally cites incomplete portions of McCracken and Hirschi' s testimony 
regarding Parkway's agreement to pay off Campbell's Loan. Parkway argues it could have done 
whatever it wanted regarding Campbell's debt, including paying in installment payments, negotiating 
a settlement, off-setting the amount against another debt or waiting for Campbell to be sued, among 
other things. (Appellant's Brief, p. 23). The testimony and argument propounded by Parkway 
certainly supports a possible fraudulent intent on the part of Parkway, but has no relevance to the 
breach of contract claim. As the District Court noted, Parkway presented no testimony as to any 
actions it actually took to "take care of' the debt as promised. (R., p. 242). 
Parkway's unsupported assertions that it "took care of' the debt do not comport with 
Parkway's actions leading up to and during this litigation. Parkway failed to pay the Loan when 
Campbell delivered the promissory note and wrote a thank you note thanking Parkway for paying 
off the loan. (Tr., p. 38). After receiving the thank you note from Campbell thanking Parkway for 
paying off the Loan, Parkway did not approach Campbell to ask why she thought they were actually 
paying off the debt or to tell her she was somehow mistaken. (Tr., p. 30, L. 7-21). After the BMH 
Foundation had contacted her regarding her unpaid debt, Campbell and Hirschi approached Dr. 
Steven Klippert ("Klippert") to inquire as to whether Parkway had actually paid the debt. Klippert 
said he would look into the matter. (Tr., p. 3 7, L. 17-24 ). He did not question why Campbell would 
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think the debt had or should have been paid previously. (Tr., p. 38, L. 3-9). When Parkway sought 
to entice Campbell to stay at Parkway to become the Director ofNursing, Dr. Bret Rogers stated that 
"maybe we'll pay [your Loan] this time if you accept employment." (Tr., p. 38, L. 17 - p. 39, L. 4; 
p. 41, L. 16 - p. 43, L. 7). Rogers' comment acknowledges the fact that Parkway should have 
previously paid off the debt, as agreed, but did not. Further, Parkway refused to pay the debt as 
agreed when Campbell's attorney wrote a demand letter, requesting that the debt be paid after the 
BMH Foundation made demand upon Campbell for payment. (Aug. R., Aff. ofDeAnne Casperson, 
Ex. B). In response to the letter from Campbell's counsel, Parkway did not assert it could have paid 
off or taken care of the debt in any number of ways, as now suggested by Parkway. Rather, Parkway 
claimed at the time that it did have an agreement with Campbell, but that the agreement required 
Campbell to work for Parkway for three years, (Tr., p. 265, L. 15 - p. 266, L. 9, Ex. H), a position 
which Parkway ultimately abandoned, and regarding which Parkway presented no supporting 
evidence. Dr. Robert Lee ("Lee"), who authored the response to Campbell's demand, however, did 
provide a significant amount of testimony which contradicted the contents of the letter as well as 
Parkway's discovery responses which he personally verified. (Tr., p. 266, L. 10 - p. 274, L. 17). 
Neither after Campbell provided Parkway with the promissory note and thank you letter, nor after 
Campbell informed Parkway that BMH was seeking repayment of the debt from her, did Parkway 
assert that it was not obligated to pay off the debt but could take care of the obligation "in a variety 
of ways." (Appellant's Brief, p. 23). Parkway's argument that it somehow complied with the terms 
of the agreement by not paying Campbell's debt is unsupported by the evidence, and should be 
disregarded. Moreover, Parkway's argument would require that this Court second-guess the 
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Magistrate Court's findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, something it cannot do when the District 
Court has affirmed the Magistrate Court's decision and the Magistrate Court's decision is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. The Magistrate Court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law holding that Parkway was required to pay off Campbell's debt to BMH as part of the agreement 
between Campbell and Parkway, affirmed by the District Court, should be upheld. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE 
COURT'S DECISION ON CAMPBELL'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM 
REQUIRING PARKWAY TO PAY THE LOAN AS IT PROMISED 
Parkway claims the District Court erred by affirming the Magistrate Court's decision on the 
breach of contract claim and remanding the case to reform the judgment to require Parkway to pay 
the Loan directly to the BMH Foundation. The Magistrate Court required that the money to pay off 
the Loan to be paid to Campbell so that she could "tender the amount to 'Foundation' to extinguish 
her obligation with them and to thus rehabilitate her reputation in the local medical community." 
(R., p. 89). Based on this language used by the Magistrate Court, and Campbell's request for specific 
performance, the District Court affirmed the decision on the breach of contract as follows: 
Thus Campbell sued for a decree directing Parkway to pay Campbell's debt to the 
Foundation. In other words, Campbell sued Parkway for specific performance of its 
oral agreement to take care of Campbell's debt to the Foundation. Judge Brower 
awarded Campbell monetary damages in the amount of Campbell's debt, together 
with any accrued interest, with the assumption that Campbell would tender that 
amount to the Foundation. 
*** 
Accordingly, Campbell is not entitled to a direct money judgment against Parkway, 
but she is entitled to a decree of specific performance of her agreement with Parkway. 
Judge Brower erred in awarding the amount of the debt to Campbell. On remand, the 
Amended Judgment shall be reformed to decree that Campbell is entitled to specific 
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performance of Parkway's promise to pay the Foundation for the amount of 
Campbell's debt, together with interest. 
(R., p. 237). As explained by this Court, "'[t]he remedy of specific performance may be invoked 
where necessary to complete justice between the parties. The object of specific performance is to 
best effectuate the purpose for which the contract is made, and specific performance should be 
granted upon such terms and conditions as justice requires.' 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance § 2 
(2011 ). In considering whether to award specific performance, a court must balance the equities 
between the parties." Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591, 597-98, 249 P.3d 390, 396-97 (2011) (citing 
Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 823, 136 P.3d 291, 294 (2006)). 
Campbell pied in her breach of contract claim a request for damages, or in the alternative, 
a request for Parkway to actual pay the Loan to the BMH Foundation. (R., p. 57-58, 61). Whether 
the funds are paid to Campbell so that she can pay the BMH Foundation or Parkway pays them 
directly to the BMH Foundation makes little difference to Campbell. Throughout the litigation, and 
at trial, Campbell has made it clear that she wanted Parkway to fulfill its promise. ( Campbell Depo. 
Tr., p. 43, L. 6-21; p. 12, L. 18 - p. 13, L. 7; p. 48, L. 25 -p. 49, L.19; p. 63, L. 14 - p. 64, L. 7). 
Parkway induced Campbell to leave her employment with BMH, creating the debt to the Foundation, 
with Parkway's promise to pay the debt and she is entitled to have it paid. The Magistrate Court 
clearly intended by its ruling that Parkway be required to pay off Campbell's debt, albeit through 
Campbell, with the BMH Foundation. (R., p. 102). Instead of funneling the debt payment through 
Campbell to the BMH Foundation, the District Court found that Campbell's requested remedy, 
asking that Parkway be ordered to pay off the Loan, i.e., specific performance, was the appropriate 
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remedy under the circumstances and what appeared to be intended by the Magistrate Court. As set 
forth below, Parkway has failed to demonstrate that the District Court's decision was in error. 
1. Campbell Requested the Remedy of Specific Performance of Parkway's Promise 
to Pay Campbell's Loan. 
Parkway's argument that the remedy of specific performance was a surprise and raised for 
the first time by the District Court (Appellant's Brief, p. 7) is contradicted repeatedly by the record. 
On numerous occasions, Campbell put Parkway on notice that she was requesting an order from 
the Court that Parkway pay the debt as promised the promise Parkway made to induce Campbell 
to leave her employment with BMH. In fact, in the demand letter Campbell initially sent to Parkway, 
she requested exactly what she has always wanted- that Parkway pay the Foundation as it agreed 
it would do if Campbell ended her employment with BMH and came to work for Parkway. (Aug. 
R., Aff. of DeAnne Casperson, Ex. B). Campbell performed her end of the agreement, while 
Parkway, initially unbeknownst to Campbell, failed to pay the Loan. It was not until Campbell 
received a telephone call in 2005 and an invoice from the BMH Foundation, requesting payment, 
that she learned Parkway failed to perform its end of the agreement. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-25; p. 46, L. 
6 - p. 47, L. 4). After Parkway refused to pay the Foundation as agreed, Campbell initiated legal 
action against Parkway. 
Although Campbell did not use the words "specific performance" in the Second Amended 
Complaint, she put Parkway on notice that she was requesting specific performance. "The Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure set forth a system of notice pleading intended to free litigants from what 
were once rigid pleading requirements." Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 752, 274 
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P.3d 1256, 1266 (2012). As set forth in Carillo, this Court has explained the purpose of notice 
pleading: 
The general policy behind the current rules of civil procedure is to provide every 
litigant with his or her day in court. The rules are to be construed to secure a just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. The purpose 
of a complaint is to inform the defendant of the material facts upon which the 
plaintiff bases his action. A complaint need only contain a concise statement of the 
facts constituting the case of action and a demand for relief. 
Id (quoting Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986)). "A party's pleadings 
should be liberally construed to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case." 
Mickelsen Const. Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 406, 299 P.3d 203, 213 (2013) (quoting 
Youngbloodv. Higbee, 145 Idaho 665,668, 182 P.3d 1199, 1202 (2008)). "Under notice pleading, 
a party is no longer slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings. . . . The general 
policy behind the current rules of civil procedure is to provide every litigant his or her day in court." 
Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,807,229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010). 
In her Second Amended Complaint, Campbell asserted a breach of contract/declaratory 
judgment claim, and requested remedies as follows: 
• Plaintiff has incurred damages and will continue to incur damages, and/or is 
entitled to a declaratory judgment directing Defendant to repay her Forgivable 
Loan Agreement with Bingham Memorial." (R., p. 58). 
• For a declaratory judgment ordering Defendant to pay to Bingham Memorial 
the principal amount of $6,800.00 plus interest to be determined upon 
judgment, or, in the alternative, for a money judgment in the principal amount 
of$6,800.00 plus an award of interest in an amount to be determined upon 
judgment. (R., p. 61 ). 
• For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premises. (R., p. 61 ). 
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The Second Amended Complaint actually provides more detail, specifically requesting the actual 
performance requested based on the promise given. The fact that Campbell described the actual 
performance she was requesting based on the agreement instead of using the words "specific 
performance" provides Parkway more notice, not less. Further, under the liberal pleading rules, 
Campbell is not required to use any magic words to assert a claim or request a remedy. However, 
Campbell provided more detail than the pleading standard, actually setting forth the actual act of 
specific performance requested. 
Further, Parkway's argument that Campbell failed to make her request for specific 
performance an issue during the litigation and at trial is belied by the record. During the course of 
the litigation, Parkway deposed Campbell. Parkway's counsel specifically inquired about Campbell's 
claim for relief from the Second Amended Complaint: 
BY MR. SORENSEN: 
Q. I am looking at your second amended complaint. It's on file with the court. 
And it says you want the defendant, which is Parkway, to pay 
Bingham Memorial $6,800 plus interest to be determined on the judgement; 
or in the alternative for a money judgement and principal amount of $6,800 
plus an award of interest in the amount to be determined upon judgement. 
So are you saying that if you don't have to pay Parkway or pay 
Bingham Memorial Hospital any money back, do you still want my clients to 
pay you $6,800? 
A. I want them to pay Bingham $6,800. 
Q. So, you're not asking for money for yourself, only for Bingham? 
A. Correct. 
(Campbell Depo. Tr., p. 43, L. 6-21). At the onset of trial, Campbell's counsel in her opening 
statement, again made the request for actual performance of the agreement as follows: 
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(Ms. Ulrich) And, Your Honor, that is why we have brought this case for Ms. 
Campbell, is that she just wants to have that loan paid off. She loved working at 
Bingham Memorial. It was a good place. They were good people there. She has local 
ties. And she doesn't want her reputation ruined because Parkway didn't fulfill its part 
of a promise. 
She's an honest person. She wants to keep that reputation. And she wants 
Bingham Memorial to have that loan paid back to them too because it's the 
right thing to do and that is what Parkway agreed to. 
And so that's why today we are just asking you to enforce this agreement and 
require Parkway to do what it promised to do in return for Ms. Campbell 
coming to work for them. 
(Tr., p. 12, L. 18 - p. 13, L. 7) (bold emphasis added). In response, Parkway's counsel made no 
objection. In its opening statement, Parkway primarily argued that there was no "meeting of the 
minds" and therefore, no contract. (Tr., p. 13, L. 11 - p. 14, L. 17). Campbell confirmed at trial that 
the BMH Foundation contacted her to obtain payment and sent her an invoice, showing what she 
owed. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-25; p. 46, L. 6-p. 47, L.4, Pl. Ex. 8)2• In addition, Campbell fully admitted 
that she had not paid the debt, and expected Parkway to directly pay it as promised. (Tr., p. 36, L. 
21-25; p. 48, L.14-p. 49, L. 19; p. 60, L. 25 -p. 61, L. 2). Parkway's counsel demonstrated his clear 
2 Parkway repeatedly asserts, for the first time on this second appeal, that Campbell never 
presented evidence of an obligation between herself and the BMH Foundation. First, Parkway has 
waived this argument, and it should not be considered by this Court. See Garner v. Bartschi, 139 
Idaho 430,436, 80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003) (citingMcPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,397, 64 P.3d 
317, 323 (2003)). However, assuming arguendo, that this issue is properly before the Court, 
Campbell presented evidence of both the agreement and her continuing obligation to BMH at trial 
via the Bingham Memorial Hospital Foundation Forgivable Loan Promissory Note and the Bingham 
Memorial Hospital Forgivable Loan Agreement (Tr., p. 20, L. 20 - p. 21, L. 16; PL Ex. A), the 
balance statement from BMH sent to Campbell when BMH sought to collect the loan debt in 2005 
(Tr., p. 45, L. 1 - p. 46, L. 5; PL Ex. B) and Campbell's own testimony. (Tr., p. 46, L. 6-24). The 
Magistrate Court found that Campbell owed a debt to BMH. (R., p. 85, ,i 4; p. 86, ,r 7; p. 86, ,r 9). 
The District Court acknowledged the Magistrate Court's finding that Campbell owed a debt to the 
BMH Foundation. (R., p. 221, p. 222). There is no question that Campbell presented substantial and 
competent evidence of her obligation to the BMH Foundation. 
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understanding as to what Campbell was seeking as a remedy from the breach of contract claim in 
his cross examination at trial: 










What you really wanted this to be was a 
signing bonus, didn't you? 
No, sir. 
You wanted to be repaid $6,800 even if you walked out of 
the door and resigned from Parkway -- or resigned from 
the hospital and worked one minute for the Parkway 
Surgery Center, you thought that obligated them to pay 
the money to you; is that right? 
I don't want them to pay the money to me. 
Okay. 
The money needs -
So you never wanted the money. But to the hospital, is 
that right? 
That's correct. 
Did you think that -- my understanding is that you thought 
that, as part of the deal to leave Bingham Memorial 
Hospital, that, in your mind, Parkway was going to repay 
this obligation? 
Correct. 
(Tr., p. 63, L. 14 - p. 64, L. 7). Parkway demonstrated a full understanding that Campbell was 
requesting that Parkway pay the Loan directly to the BMH Foundation. Parkway's argument that 
Campbell failed to plead or present evidence of her request for specific performance is without merit 
and should be disregarded. 
2. The District Court Correctly Found Evidence to Support Specific Performance 
as the Appropriate Remedy Presented at Trial and on Appeal. 
In order to avoid any damages as a result of its breach of contract, Parkway argues that 
Campbell cannot receive monetary damages without having paid the Loan first, and that Campbell 
is not entitled to specific performance, giving Parkway a windfall of never having to perform its 
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promise in spite of its breach. Parkway ignores the well-established law that an appellate court may 
affirm the trial court's decision if an alternative legal basis supports it. See Hanf v. Syringa Realty, 
Inc., 120 Idaho 364,370, 816 P.2d 320,326 (1991). "It is well established that this Court will use 
the correct legal theory to affirm the correct decision of a district court even when it is based on an 
erroneous legal theory." J.R. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849,853,820 
P.2d 1206, 1210 (1991). Citing to In re Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho 669,675 P.3d 664,670 (Ct. App. 
2000), the District Court recognized and applied its authority to affirm the decision but to remand 
to reform the judgment according to the correct legal authority. (R., p. 237). In fact, the District 
Court recognized that the Magistrate Court intended the BMH Foundation to receive the money from 
Parkway: "In her Second Amended Complaint, Campbell requested specific performance of 
Parkway's promise and Judge Brower indicated his intent that the award to Campbell would be paid 
to the Foundation. Accordingly, Judge Brower's Amended Judgment shall be remanded for 
reformation as instructed above." (R., p. 239). 
The District Court also correctly identified Campbell's right to pursue a claim for the breach 
as the promisee as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 305, comment a: 
a. The promisee 's right. The promisee of a promise for the benefit of a beneficiary 
has the same right to performance as any other promisee, whether the promise is 
binding because part of a bargain, because of his reliance, or because of its formal 
characteristics. If the promisee has no economic interest in the performance, as in 
many cases involving gift promises, the ordinary remedy of damages for breach of 
contract is an inadequate remedy, since only nominal damages can be recovered. In 
such cases specific performance is commonly appropriate. See§ 307. In the ordinary 
case of a promise to pay the promisee's debt, on the other hand, the promisee may 
suffer substantial damages as a result of breach by the promisor. So long as there is 
no conflict with rights of the beneficiary or the promisor, he is entitled to recover 
such damages. See § 310. 
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 305, cmt. a. Because Campbell has an economic interest 
in the payment of her own debt, she could seek either specific performance or contract damages. 
Although Campbell asserts the remedy could have been fashioned under direct damages to her or 
as specific performance, the District Court's decision to remand the case to reform the judgment so 
the money damages are directly paid to the BMH Foundation is exactly what Campbell has 
consistently sought. Further, Campbell has no objection to the money damages being paid directly 
to the BMH Foundation because it resolves any potential claim by the Foundation as a beneficiary, 
which resolves any future claims. 
Parkway fails to explain how specific performance is inappropriate under the circumstances. 
This Court has set forth the basic requirements of specific performance as follows: 
The general rules of the common law are that: (1) a party is entitled to the equitable 
remedy of specific performance when damages, the legal remedy, are inadequate; (2) 
because of the perceived uniqueness of land, it is presumed that damages are 
inadequate in an action for breach of a land sale contract, and the non-breaching party 
need not make a separate showing of the inadequacy of damages; (3) the remedy is 
equally available to both vendors and purchasers; and (4) additionally, the 
appropriateness of specific performance as relief in a particular case lies within the 
discretion of the trial court. 
Perron v. Hale, 108 Idaho 578,582, 701 P.2d 198,202 (1985). Although the District Court did not 
cite this general statement regarding specific performance, it clearly recognized the authority from 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 307, "Remedy of Specific Performance" when there 
has been a promise to pay a debt to a third party. (R., p. 236). The District Court's analysis of the 
need for specific performance takes into account the position of both parties based on the findings 
of fact from the Magistrate Court. The Magistrate Court found that Parkway breached its agreement 
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with Campbell by its failure to pay the Loan. (R., p. 87-88). The Magistrate Court also found that 
Campbell's debt to the BMH Foundation "remains unpaid and unsatisfied," and that "Parkway has 
refused to pay this debt on behalf of Ms. Campbell." (R., p. 86). Further, the Magistrate Court 
intended that Campbell tender the damages to the BMH Foundation. (R., p. 89). Based on the 
substantial and competent evidence, the District Court correctly found that specific performance was 
the more appropriate legal remedy under the circumstances, and the remedy that appeared to be 
intended by the Magistrate Court. In addition, there is no dispute that if Campbell is not entitled to 
money damages, the legal remedy of nominal damages is inadequate. The remedy of specific 
performance also protects Parkway's interests by resolving claims from Campbell and the BMH 
Foundation as against Parkway. Further, specific performance in this case, particularly where it is 
merely a money judgment paid to a third party instead of the promisee, "best effectuates the purpose 
for which the contract was made." See Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591, 597-98, 249 P.3d 390, 396-
97 (2011). Further, Parkway presents no argument that specific performance would be "unjust, 
oppressive, or unconscionable." Id Consequently, the District Court's decision should be affirmed. 
3. Parkway Waived Any Argument Related to the Declaratory Judgment Act and 
the Request for Specific Performance Because it Raised No Objection. 
On February 24, 2009, Campbell filed a motion to amend, attaching the proposed Second 
Amended Complaint to the motion. (Aug. R., Motion to Amend Complaint, Ex. A). In the Second 
Amended Complaint, Campbell amended her previously stated breach of contract claim to assert a 
causeofactionfor"BREACHOFCONTRACT/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT." (R.,p. 57-58). 
In paragraph 20 of that cause of action, Campbell asserted the following: "As a result of Defendant's 
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breach, Plaintiff has incurred damages and will continue to incur damages, and/or is entitled to a 
declaratory judgment directing Defendant to repay her Forgivable Loan Agreement with Bingham 
Memorial." (R., p. 58). In addition, Campbell modified her prayer for relief to specifically ask for 
"a declaratory judgment ordering Defendant to pay to Bingham Memorial the principal amount of 
$6,800.00 plus interest to be determined upon judgment..." and for "such other and further relief as 
the Court deems just and equitable in the premises." (R., p. 61 ). Campbell did not cite the provisions 
of the Declaratory Judgment Act anywhere in the Second Amended Complaint. (R., p. 54-64). 
In response to the motion, Parkway submitted an objection, but never raised any objection 
to this cause of action. (Aug. R., Response to Mot. to Amend Complaint). In fact, the first time 
Parkway has ever raised any objection to Campbell's breach of contract/ declaratory judgment cause 
of action is in this appeal. Parkway never asserted that Campbell's claim for breach of 
contract/declaratory judgment action was not allowable before the Magistrate Court or the District 
Court. Parkway can hardly claim error based on Campbell's breach of contract/declaratory judgment 
cause of action, asking for Parkway to be required to actually perform its agreement, when it never 
objected, sought a motion to dismiss, or took any other action. Further, Parkway filed a 
counterclaim, cross-claim, and requested a jury trial - all of which demonstrate it did not view the 
action as solely a declaratory judgment proceeding. (R., p. 65-72). Parkway also tried the case, 
knowing the remedy Campbell wanted was for Parkway to pay the debt to the BMH Foundation (Tr., 
p. 63, L. 14-p. 64, L. 2). From the Second Amended Complaint, it is obvious Campbell's use of the 
term "declaratory judgment" was intended to illustrate the unique nature of Campbell's status in 
bringing a breach of contract claim to force Parkway to pay Campbell's debt to another party or for 
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her to obtain contract damages so she could pay the debt off herself. Although it would have been 
more accurate for Campbell to title the claim "breach of contract/decree of specific performance," 
the intent from the alternate remedies requested was sufficient to put Parkway on notice of the 
remedy Campbell was requesting. 
Further, Parkway's argument that a claim for damages or specific performance could not be 
included with a declaratory judgment action is incorrect. As the District Court for the Fourth 
Judicial District noted, "[t]he issue in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Tucker, 142 Idaho 191, 125 
P .3d 1067 (2005) was the ability of a party to amend a complaint for declaratory relief to add a claim 
for damages when there was already a pending claim in another court on the same subject, it is not 
authority for the proposition that an action for damages may never be combined with a declaratory 
judgment action." Curtis-Klure, PLLC v. Ada County Highway Dist., Dkt. No. CV OC 0716381, 
2008 WL 8832970, n.l (Idaho Dist. Feb. 22, 2008). In fact, Idaho Code § 10-1209 specifically 
allows determinations of issues of fact as necessary. 
Because Parkway raised no objection to Campbell's cause of action for "breach of 
contract/declaratory judgment," and was on notice of the request for specific performance based on 
the Second Amended Complaint, which was demonstrated by its own conduct at trial, Parkway's 
argument should be dismissed. 
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D. EVEN IF THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NOT RELIED ON SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE, A DAMAGE AWARD DIRECTLY TO CAMPBELL WAS 
ALLOW ABLE AND COULD SERVE AS AN ALTERNATE BASIS OF AFFIRMING 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
Even if specific performance is not available to Campbell, the remedy of damages directly 
to Campbell is allowable for Campbell to pay off her debt to the BMH Foundation and compensates 
her for Parkway's breach.3 "This Court may uphold decisions on alternate grounds from those stated 
in the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw on appeal." Martel v. Balotti, 138 Idaho 451,453, 65 
P.3d 192, 194 (2003). Parkway asserts Campbell should have appealed the Magistrate Court's 
decision, but ignores that Campbell sought alternative remedies - either requiring Parkway to pay 
the BMH Foundation directly, or providing her the funds so that she could pay the debt. The 
Magistrate Court's decision and the District Court's decision accomplished that request. As an 
alternative to specific performance, however, Campbell asserts that damages to her for the purpose 
of paying off her debt is an alternative legal theory to affirm the decision of the District Court. 
Campbell is entitled to protect her economic interests in Parkway's promise to pay her debt. 
The law in Idaho is quite clear on the issue of contract damages: 
A plaintiff is entitled to recover damages sustained as a breach of the contract. The 
damages for a breach of contract are compensatory damages or damages that will 
fully compensate the non-breaching party for the loss suffered as a result of the 
breach of contract. The compensatory damages are measured by the amount that 
would be necessary to put the plaintiff in as good a position as would full 
performance of the contract. Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738, 864 P.2d 184 
(Ct.App.1993); O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,810 P.2d 1082 (1991). 
3 Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 15, a respondent may raise an additional issue on appeal 
that does not seek affirmative relief. Campbell asserts this issue is an alternate method of affirming 
the District Court's decision. 
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Jenicek v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., CV-01-05652, 2003 WL 23914536 (Idaho Dist. Aug. 11, 
2003) (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344 (1981). There is 
no doubt that if Parkway had actually performed its part of the contract as promised, it would have 
paid the debt owed by Campbell to the BMH Foundation, and the debt would subsequently cease to 
exist. Campbell produced as evidence the invoice she received from the BMH Foundation and 
testimony regarding telephone calls from the BMH Foundation regarding payment of the debt and 
the amount. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-25; p. 44, L. 23 - p. 46, L. 24; PL Ex. B). On December 29, 2005, the 
BMH Foundation's invoice to Campbell indicated she owed $8,005.96 with interest continuing to 
accrue. (PL Ex. B). Incurring debt as a result of a breach of contract is damage and entitles Campbell 
to receive damages because she has an economic interest in the performance promised by Parkway. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 305, 307. Section 305 provides the following 
example: 
Illustrations: 4. A owes C $100. For consideration B promises A to pay the debt to 
C. On B's breach A may obtain a judgment for $ 100 against B. But the court may 
protect B against double payment by permittingjoinder of C, by an order that money 
collected by A is to be applied to reduce A's debt to C, by giving B credit on the 
judgment for payments to C which reduce A's obligation, or by enjoining 
enforcement of the judgment to the extent of such payment. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 305, cmt. b, Ills. 4. The Magistrate Court primarily 
followed this example by giving a money judgment to Campbell to be paid to the BMH Foundation: 
"The above-stated money judgment shall be paid directly to Ms. Campbell so that she may tender 
such amount to Bingham Memorial Hospital Foundation to extinguish her obligation .... " (R., p. 
102.) Further, the substantial case law addressing the unique circumstance of an agreement to pay 
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the debt of another illustrates Campbell can recover damage in the amount of the debt. Although 
this narrow issue could not be found in any Idaho case, the well established holding in other states 
is that where a party has agreed to pay the debt of another to obtain economic benefit, the debt does 
not have to be paid by the non-breaching party in order to establish damages and the amount of 
damages are measured by the amount of the debt that was to be paid. Much of the case law 
regarding this issue is approximately 100 years old. Many of the cases acknowledge the consensus 
that the debt does not have to be repaid to pursue the breach. In a more recent case addressing this 
topic oflaw, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled on an agreement to pay the debt of another. See Mead 
v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S. W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981 ). In Mead, the parties agreed in association with 
the sale of the business that Johnson Group would pay certain debts of the business. Id at 686. When 
Johnson Group failed to pay the debts, Mead filed suit for the breach, claiming damages for the 
unpaid debts. A jury awarded Mead damages for the unpaid debts. The trial court reversed, holding 
Mead could not recover on the unpaid debt without paying the debt first. In reversing the trial court, 
the Texas Supreme Court held as follows: 
In a suit similar to the instant case involving the sale of business and assumption of 
existing debts, it was held the contract created a direct obligation from the promisor 
to the promisee and did not require that the promisee first pay the debts in order to 
recover. Cohen v. Simpson, 32 S.W. 59, 61 (Tex.Civ.App. 1895, writ dism'd). See 
also Smith v. Smith, 595 S.W.2d 631,632 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1980, no writ). 
There are other cases in which Texas courts have permitted recovery for expenses 
incurred without first requiring payment by the plaintiff. See, e. g., Triton Oil & Gas 
Corp. v. E. W Moran Drilling Co., 509 S.W.2d 678,686 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 
1974, writ refd n. r. e.) (materials and services in drilling contract); Taylor v. Mark, 
376 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1964, writ refd n. r. e.) (materials in a 
construction contract); San Antonio &A. P. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 31 Tex.Civ.App. 371, 
72 S.W. 226,228 (1903, writrefd) (medical expenses). This court noted in Smith v. 
Nesbitt, supra, 230 S. W. at 978, that proper orders directing the promisee to apply the 
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recovery to payment of the debt would prevent double recovery. Here, the trial court 
so ordered. Johnson received valuable assets from Mead from which he has 
profited. He breached the contract, yet is relieved of the obligation to perform 
that which he agreed to do pay the SBA loan and business debts. To permit this 
result is inequitable and allows Johnson to be unjustly enriched. We hold that 
Mead is not required first to pay the loan and debts assumed under the 
contract. 
Id. at 689 ( emphasis added). The holding in Mead is reflected in numerous other cases from many 
other jurisdictions all addressing the failure to pay another's debt pursuant to contract. See Fairfield 
v. Day, 71 N.H. 63, 51 A. 263 (1901) (measure of damages is full amount of accrued liability); 
Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500,507 (1876) (repayment is not required in order to pursue breach 
of contract claim); Heins v. Byers, 174 Minn. 350,352 (1928) (measure of damages is amount of 
debt);Lathropv. Atwood, 21 Conn. 117, 123-24 (1851) (no obligation to repay debt when breaching 
party obtained direct benefit); Locke v. Homer, 131 Mass. 93, 102 (1881) (same); Merriam v. Pine 
City Lumber Co., 23 Minn. 314 (1877) (same); Meyer v. Parsons, 129 Cal. 653, 655-56, 62 P. 216 
(1900) (same); Stokes v. Robertson, 143 Ga. 721, 85 S.E. 895 (1915) (same); Stout v. Folger, 34 
Iowa 71, 75-76, 1872 WL 182 (1871) (same); Turner v. Howze, 28 Cal. App. 167, 170-71, 151 P. 
751 (1915) (same); and Wrightv. Chapin, 87 Hun. 144, 33 N.Y.S. 1068, 1070-71(N.Y. Gen. Term, 
1895) (same). For the Court's convenience, the relevant holdings from these cases are set forth in 
Addendum A. Just like Mead, Campbell is entitled to either specific performance or damages for the 
debt Parkway agreed to pay and did not so she can extinguish her debt. 
In addition, Idaho court's have allowed the recovery of damages without requiring payment 
by the plaintiff first. In Warm Springs Development Assoc. Limited Partnership v. Burrows, 120 
Idaho 280,285,815 P.2d 478,483 (Ct. App. 1991), a landlord brought a breach of contract claim 
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for physical damages done to the premises. The tenant argued that the landlord could not recover 
for damages to the leased property because the landlord had not actually performed any of the 
repairs, but only provided testimony and estimates of the amounts necessary to make the repairs as 
a result of the damage allegedly done by the tenant. See id The Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument, holding that the evidence proved the damages with reasonable certainty as follows: 
When a tenant covenants to keep the premises in good repair, the landlord is not 
obligated to repair the property at the expiration of the lease, and nothing in this lease 
prevents Warm Springs from making an agreement with the next lessee to repair the 
property or accept the premises in the condition they are in. To recover damages 
under count two of the complaint, Warm Springs had only to show that the damages 
were proved with reasonable certainty. This requirement was met through the 
testimony of King. 
See id Just like Warm Springs, Campbell established the amount of the damage to her as a result 
of the existing debt and interest that had accrued by her testimony and the invoice from the BMH 
Foundation. (Tr., p. 36, L. 21-25; p. 44, L. 23 - p. 46, L. 24, Pl. Ex. B). Parkway did not present any 
evidence that the calculations of the debt were incorrect, or that the debt did not exist. Campbell 
proved the amount of damage with reasonable certainty. 
Campbell's expectation in entering into the contract with Parkway, and performing her part 
by leaving her employment with BMH, thereby incurring a debt, was that Parkway would pay her 
debt to the BMH Foundation as promised. Whether this is accomplished by damages to Campbell 
so she can pay off the debt or by way of specific performance, Campbell is entitled to the benefit of 
her bargain. Pursuant to Idaho case law regarding contract damages, and the law in other 
jurisdictions pertaining to contracts in which a party agrees to pay the debt of another and then 
breaches, the damages suffered by the non-breaching party are measured by the amount of the debt 
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which the breaching party did not pay. Because the contract is not one of indemnity, there is no 
obligation for the non-breaching party to pay the debt first. Consequently, even if specific 
performance is inapplicable, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. 
E. CAMPBELL'S AGREEMENT WITH PARKWAY IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Parkway argues yet again on appeal that Campbell's agreement with Parkway was barred by 
the statute of frauds. However, the agreement between Campbell and Parkway falls within an 
exception to the statute of frauds and is therefore not barred. With regard to Parkway's statute of 
frauds argument, Parkway acknowledges the exception to the statute of frauds found in Idaho Code 
§ 9-506(3) which provides that oral agreements to answer for the debt of another are enforceable 
where the promising party gains some direct benefit for itself by making such promise. See LC.§ 9-
506(3). However, Parkway argues that Idaho Code§ 9-506(3) does not apply. 
Idaho Code § 9-506 provides as follows: 
A promise to answer for the obligation of another, in any of the following cases, is 
deemed an original obligation of the promisor, and need not be in writing: 
[ ... ] 
3. Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made upon 
the consideration that the party receiving it cancels the antecedent obligation, 
accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the consideration that the 
party receiving it releases the property of another from a levy, or his person from 
imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained upon the antecedent 
obligation; or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from 
either party to the antecedent obligation, or from another person. 
LC. § 9-506(3). The language of§ 9-506(3) in particular which is pertinent to the situation at hand 
is "[w]here the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made ... upon a 
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consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either party to the antecedent 
obligation, or from another person." LC. § 9-506(3). Although Parkway attempts to skirt case law 
on this issue to create its own interpretation of the meaning ofldaho Code§ 9-506(3), there is ample 
Idaho case law, as well as case law from other jurisdictions, explaining the meaning of this particular 
exception to the statute of frauds. The Idaho Supreme Court noted in Johnson Cattle Co., Inc. v. 
Idaho First Nat. Bank, 110 Idaho 604, 719 P.2d 1376 (1986), that Idaho Code§ 9-506(3) "allows 
for enforcement of an oral promise to answer for the debt of another if the promisor obtains a direct 
benefit." Id., 110 Idaho at 607, 719 P.2d at 1379. This rule is generally known as the "leading-
object rule" or the "main-purpose rule," and is defined in BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY as "[t]he 
doctrine that if a promise to guarantee another's debt is made primarily for the promisor' s own 
benefit, then the statute of frauds does not apply and the promise need not be in writing to be 
enforceable." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Other jurisdictions have recognized this 
rule taking oral promises out of the statute of frauds as well. See, i.e., Trans-Gear v. Lichtenberger, 
715 N.E.2d 608 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Hite Crane & Rigging, Inc., 
678 P.2d 346 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); and Haas Drilling Co. v. First Nat. Bank Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 
886 (Tex. 1970). This is exactly the situation Campbell found herself in with Parkway. Parkway, 
through McCracken, its Administrator/CFO at the time, made an oral promise to Campbell that if 
would she would come to work for Parkway, Parkway would pay off her Loan to the BMH 
Foundation. (R., p. 86). McCracken made this promise at the direction of Parkway's board. (R., 
p. 85-86). Parkway obtained a direct benefit from this promise to Campbell, i.e., Campbell quitting 
her job at BMH and coming to work for Parkway. Parkway's main purpose in agreeing to pay off 
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Campbell's loan with BMH was to obtain for itself the benefit of having Campbell come to work 
for Parkway. Parkway's promise to answer for Campbell's debt was primarily for Parkway's benefit, 
and therefore, Parkway's oral agreement with Campbell to pay off her debt with the BMH 
Foundation falls outside the statute of frauds and is enforceable. 
Parkway also argues that Campbell's agreement with Parkway is not enforceable because, 
when Campbell negotiated with Parkway for Parkway to pay Campbell's debt to the BMH 
Foundation directly, Campbell became a non-party to the Loan between herself and BMH, and, 
therefore, has no right to enforce her agreement with Parkway.4 (See Appellant's Brief, p. 33-34). 
In support ofthis argument, Parkway cites to the dissenting opinion in Jones v. Better Homes, Inc., 
79 Idaho 294,300, 316 P.2d 256 (1957), which does not address the particular statute of frauds 
exception at issue here. Moreover, Parkway's argument that Campbell has no ability to enforce the 
agreement she made with Parkway would belie the existence ofldaho Code§ 9-506(3) in the first 
place, rendering it superfluous and meaningless. Parkway's argument appears to imply that the only 
party with enforceable rights under the "leading object" rule exception to the statute of frauds is the 
original creditor. However, such a position is not legally tenable, given that no direct contractual 
relationship need exist with the original creditor in order for the subsequent agreement to answer for 
the original debt to be enforceable against the promising party. Parkway has cited to no case law 
indicating that, under the§ 9-506(3) statute of frauds exception, Campbell has no right to enforce 
her agreement with Parkway. 
4 As set forth in Section VI.A.3, both the beneficiary and the promisee have a right of 
enforcement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,§ 305, cmt. a. 
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Although there is no Idaho case law directly on point, the Ohio Court of Appeals has 
addressed this very issue: 
If, however, the trial court determines that the promisor did not become primarily 
liable, and the original debtor remains liable, then the promise is nothing more than 
a collateral or secondary promise to answer for the debt of another, and the Statute 
of Frauds is applicable. Then, at that juncture, the court may inquire "whether the 
promisor's leading object was to subserve his own business or pecuniary interest." 
Id. at 459, 8.O.O.3d at 449,377 N.E.2d at 518. This is commonly referred to as the 
leading-object rule and exception. See Mentor Lumber & Supply Co. v. Victor (Dec. 
31, 1990), Lake App. No. 89-L-14-103, unreported, 1990 WL 237185. When the 
leading object of the promisor is not to answer for another's debt but to subserve 
some pecuniary or business purpose of his own involving a benefit to himself, his 
secondary or collateral promise is not within the Statute of Frauds. Wilson Floors. 
In the instant case, the record strongly supports the trial court's determination that 
Lichtenberger was a secondary and not a primary obligor. Clearly, Booher still 
remained obligated to Trans-Gear, despite any guaranty of Lichtenberger. Thus, the 
second phase of the Wilson Floors test needed to be employed: 
"Under the second test, it is of no consequence that when such 
promise is made, the original obligor remains primarily liable or that 
the third party continues to look to the original obligor for payment. 
So long as the promisor undertakes to pay the subcontractor whatever 
his services are worth irrespective of what he may owe the general 
contractor, and so long as the main purpose of the promisor is to 
further his own business or pecuniary interest, the promise is 
enforceable. Thus, under this test it is not required to show as a 
condition precedent for enforceability of the oral contract that the 
original debt is extinguished." Id at 459-460, 8 O.O.3d at 449, 377 
N.E.2d at 519. 
Trans-Gear, Inc. v. Lichtenberger, 128 Ohio App.3d 504,510, 715 N.E.2d 608,611 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1998). Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-506(3), Campbell is entitled to enforce an oral agreement 
between herself and Parkway through which Parkway was obligated to pay off Campbell's debt to 
the BMH Foundation directly. Parkway's argument that Campbell has no contractual rights to 
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enforce a contract which terms she personally negotiated and from which she has an economic 
interest has no basis in law. Because Parkway obtained a direct benefit from the verbal agreement 
with Campbell to pay the Loan, the statute of frauds is inapplicable. Consequently, the District 
Court's decision on the statute of frauds should be affirmed. 
F. AS THE PREVAILING PARTY, CAMPBELL IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL, NOT PARKWAY 
1. Parkway Is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
Parkway argues it is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal based upon Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. However, because this Court should affirm the District 
Court's decision in favor of Campbell, Parkway cannot be the prevailing party on appeal and is 
therefore not entitled to attorney's fees or costs on appeal. 
2. Campbell Is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
As the prevailing party, Campbell is entitled to the costs associated with this action pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) because the amount Campbell pied was 
$25,000.005 or less, and Campbell sent demand to Parkway for payment of the amount in 
controversy more than ten days prior to the filing of the action (Aug. R., Aff. of DeAnne Casperson, 
Ex. B). Idaho Code § 12-120(1) also allows for the recovery of attorney's fees on appeal. See 
Chavez v. Barras, 146 Idaho 212,225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008). 
Additionally, Campbell is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120(3) 
because Campbell is the prevailing party and the contract at issue is in this matter between Camp bell 
5 The amount under Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) has since been amended to $35,000. 
40 
and Parkway constituted a commercial transaction. Actions brought for breach of a contract related 
to employment are considered commercial transactions and are subject to the attorney's fee provision 
ofldaho Code§ 12-120(3). See Northwest Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 842, 41 
P.3d 263,270 (2002); Teton Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485,492, 20 
P.3d 21, 28 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Campbell has prevailed in this matter on both her breach of contract claim and successfully 
defended Parkway's counterclaim. Even, assuming arguendo, that specific performance is not 
allowed and Campbell cannot personally be awarded damages, Campbell is entitled to nominal 
damages for the breach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,§ 305, cmt. a. As a result, 
Campbell is entitled to attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party in this action. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Campbell respectfully requests that the District Court's decision be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31 st day December, 2014. 
~ A.Q ,_,(;]J,R="' ~.....,~ 
DeAnne Casperson -() 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Cfapo, P .L.L.C. 
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ADDENDUM A 
J. Fairfield v. Day, 71 N.H. 63, 51 A. 263 (1901) (emphasis added): 
The contention of the defendant is that his contract in respect to the payment of the 
outstanding bills was one of indemnity merely, while the contention of the plaintiff 
is that it was one for the unconditional payment of liabilities. There being a well-
settled distinction between an agreement to indemnify and an agreement to pay, it is 
necessary in the first instance to determine the nature of the contract upon which this 
action is founded. The contract speaks for itself. By it, and for a valuable 
consideration, the defendant, among other things, "was to pay all outstanding bills 
due on account of the business," among which were the claims which are now sought 
to be recovered. This language is plain and unequivocal. It admits of but one 
construction. In common understanding and in legal effect the defendant undertook 
and agreed "to pay all outstanding bills due on account of the business" as his own 
proper debts, and not merely to indemnify the plaintiff against them. In such a case 
a recovery may be had as soon as there is a breach of the contract, and the 
measure of the damages is the full amount of the accrued liability; whereas in 
contracts of indemnity the obligee cannot recover until he has been actually 
damnified, and then only to the extent of the injury sustained by him up to the time 
of the institution of his suit. 
2. Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 507 (1876) (emphasis added): 
That a promise to pay a debt due from the promisee, even where it has not been 
paid by him, is one upon which an action may be maintained and damages 
recovered to the amount of such debt, is held by many authorities. Holmes v. 
Rhodes, 1 B. & P. 638. Cutler v. Southern, 1 Saund. 116, Wms.' note. Toussaint v. 
Martinnant, 2 T. R. 100. Martin v. Court, 2. T. R. 640. Hodgson v. Bell, 7 T. R. 97. 
Thomas v. Allen, 1 Hill, 145. Loosemore v. Radford, 9 M. & W. 657. Penny v. Foy, 
8 B. & C. 11. In Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 B. & Ad. 772, the defendant, by a settlement 
made upon his marriage, conveyed an estate upon certain trusts, and covenanted with 
the trustees to pay off incurnbrances on the estate to the amount of£ 19,000, within 
a year, and it was held, upon his failure to do so, that the trustees were entitled to 
recover the whole £19,000 in an action of covenant, although no payment had been 
made by them, and no special damage was laid or proved. Whether the contracts in 
some of these cases were anything more than contracts of indemnity, and therefore 
whether there could under our decisions have been any recovery, might perhaps be 
questioned. Cushingv. Gore, 15 Mass. 69. Little v. Little, ubi supra. That, however, 
need not now be considered, as we treat the agreement before us as one not for 
indemnity merely, but for payment. 
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3. Heins v. Byers, 174 Minn. 350,288 (1928) (emphasis added) 
The contract is not one of indemnity. It is a contract to pay and discharge a debt of 
the plaintiff made upon consideration moving from the plaintiff to the defendants. 
In cases of such sort, authorities are fairly in accord, or at least it is the 
prevailing doctrine, that one in the position of the plaintiff may recover, and 
that the amount of the debt is the measure of his damages. Merriam v. Pine City 
Lbr. Co., 23 Minn. 314; Stout v. Folger, 34 Iowa 71, 11 Am. Rep. 138; Lathrop v. 
Atwood, 21 Conn. 117; Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 20 Am. Rep. 341; Locke 
v. Homer, 131 Mass. 93, 41 Am. Rep. 199; Shattuck v. Adams, 136 Mass. 34; Lee v. 
Burrell, 51 Mich. 132, 16N.W. 309; Turnerv. Howze, 28 Cal. App. 167,151 P. 751; 
Meyer v. Parsons, 129 Cal. 653, 62 P.216; Gage v. Lewis, 68 Ill. 604; Fairfield v. 
Day, 71 N.H. 63; 51 A. 263; Stokes v. Robertson, 143 Ga. 721, 85 S.E. 895; 3 
Sutherland, Damages (4th Ed.)§ 765, p. 2892, 2893; 2 Sedgwick, Damages (9th Ed.) 
§ 789, p. 1641; 8 R.C.L. p. 463, § 30; 1 Williston, Contracts, p. 374, § 392, et seq.; 
3 Williston Contracts, p. 2500, § 1408. And this is the apparent future of the 
doctrine. See Am. L. Inst. Restatement Contracts (Tent.)§ 133(b). 
4. Lathrop v. Atwood, 21 Conn. 117, 123-24 (1851) (emphasis added): 
These debts were all then due to the respective creditors of Atwood & Lathrop, and 
the defendants proceeded to pay the same; but on the 24th day of October, when this 
suit was brought, there remained due and unpaid the sum of 635 dollars. This was 
four months after the defendants had assumed the payment; but the plaintiff had not 
been compelled to pay, nor had he paid, any of these claims, nor had he been 
subjected to any cost on account of them, at that time. And the questions now put to 
us, are, whether the defendants are liable, in this action, for the non-payment of the 
balance of the debts unpaid? The cases in which this question is discussed, are not 
free from some confusion; and yet the principles deducible from them, or explicitly 
decided by them, are clear enough. The confusion seems to have arisen from the want 
of a clear discrimination between mere contracts of indemnity, and contracts for the 
performance of some act in which the plaintiffhas an interest, from which indemnity, 
either expressly or by implication, is to result. 
We think an examination of the cases will show these reasonable doctrines; that, 
if a condition, covenant or promise be only to indemnify and save harmless a 
party from some consequence, no action can be sustained for the liability or 
exposure to loss, nor until actual damage, capable of appreciation and estimate, 
has been sustained, by the plaintiff. But if the covenant or promise be, to 
perform some act for the plaintiffs benefit, as well as to indemnify and save him 
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harmless from the consequences of non-performance, the neglect to perform the 
act, being a breach of contract, will give an immediate right of action. 
5. Locke v. Homer, 131 Mass. 93, 102 (1881) (emphasis added): 
In the case at bar, the court is therefore unanimously of the opinion that if the 
defendant, by deed or other writing signed by himself, had promised the plaintiffs to 
pay the amount of the mortgage to Aitken, the authorities are conclusive that the 
plaintiffs might have sued him on his agreement, and recovered the whole 
amount of the mortgage debt, without proving they had paid it. 
6. Merriam v. Pine City Lumber Co., 23 Minn. 314 (1877) (internal citations omitted)( emphasis 
added) 
The defendant's undertaking was not one of indemnity. It was an affirmative, 
unconditional promise to the plaintiff, upon valid consideration, to pay, within a 
specified time, a definite sum of money to a third party - the state - for his benefit. 
Though, within the doctrine ofN ew York cases upon this subject, as well as our own, 
the state might have maintained an action against defendant upon a breach of its 
agreement, it is well settled, both upon principle and authority, that the defendant 
also remained liable to plaintiff, upon its promise, by privity of contract; and a cause 
of action accrued in favor of the latter, which became complete immediately upon its 
breach by the failure of the defendant to make the payment at the stipulated time. It 
is not necessary for the promisee in this case to discharge the debt before 
asserting his right of action against the promisor, growing out of the breach of 
his own agreement. The measure of damages in a case of this kind is the 
amount of the debt agreed to be paid. 
7. Meyer v. Parsons, 129 Cal. 653, 655-56, 62 P. 216 (1900) (emphasis added): 
Appellant contends that if all that is claimed by plaintiff is true, yet he is not entitled 
to recover the $814.60, because he has not paid the same himself, and because the 
agreement was not that appellant should pay the plaintiff that amount, but that he 
should pay it to the creditors. 
In answer to this it is sufficient to say that the promise to pay the creditors was made 
to plaintiff, and that on a failure to keep that promise plaintiff is entitled to recover 
whatever damages he has sustained by reason of such failure. He is not compelled to 
rescind nor to treat the contract as rescinded, but may rely upon the contract and 
recover damages for its breach, and this is, as we understand it, just what he is 
endeavoring to do in this suit. His damages in that regard are the same whether 
he has already paid the creditors or must yet inevitably pay them. There is no 
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question but that he is yet liable to the creditors, and the extent of his right of 
recovery is not affected by the possibility that the creditors may not exact all 
that they are entitled to in discharge of their claims. The extent of appellant's 
liability is the amount that he agreed to pay for the property; and plaintiff can 
recover this full amount even though he has not paid it himself. (2 Sedgwick on 
Damages, sec. 789, and cases there cited; Banfieldv. Marks, 56 Cal. 185.). 
8. Stokes v. Robertson, 143 Ga. 721, 85 S.E. 895 (1915) (emphasis added): 
The contract on which suit was brought was not merely one of indemnity, but 
contained a direct agreement on the part of the decedent to pay off and discharge the 
notes given by Robertson as fast as they should mature. A failure to pay one of the 
notes at maturity constituted a breach of the contract, and the plaintiff could bring 
suit thereon. He was not obliged to pay the note before bringing suit. Ifhe was thus 
entitled to sue, for what amount could he bring his suit? In Thomas v. Richards, 124 
Ga. 942, 53 S. E. 400, where one person entered into a contract with another, by 
which he assumed the payment of certain notes made by the latter, maturing at 
different dates, the failure to pay any single note was held to be a breach of the 
contract, and the other party to it was held to be entitled to recover. In Gage v. Lewis, 
68 Ill. 604, it was said: 
"Where a bond is given, intended as a bond of indemnity, but containing a 
covenant that the obligor will pay certain debts for which the obligee is liable, 
and the obligor fails to perform, an action lies for the breach, and the obligee is 
entitled to recover the sums agreed to be paid, although it is not shown that he 
has been damnified, unless from the whole instrument it manifestly appears that its 
sole object was a covenant of indemnity." 
9. Stout v. Folger, 34 Iowa 711, 75, 76 (1871) (emphasis added): 
It is claimed by defendant that his contract is merely to save plaintiff from harm by 
reason of his indebtedness, and that, until plaintiff has paid the debt, he is not 
damnified, and cannot recover. We have examined the numerous authorities cited 
in defendant's brief, and while they are not altogether free from confusion, yet we 
think underlying them will be found the following doctrines: That is a condition or 
promise be only to indemnify and save harmless a party from some consequence, no 
action can be maintained until actual damage has been sustained by the plaintiff. But 
if the covenant or promise be to perform some act for the plaintiff's benefit, as 
well as to indemnify and save him harmless from the consequences of non-
performance, the neglect to perform the act is a breach of contract, and will give 
him an immediate right of action. See Lathrop v. Atwood, 21 Conn. 116. 
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The authorities argee that upon an undertaking to pay a debt due a third 
person, the plaintiff may maintain an action without showing that he has paid 
the debt. Lathrop v. Atwood, supra; In re Negus, 7 Wend. 499; Port v. Jackson, 17 
Johns. 239; Thomas v. Allen, I Hill. 145; Churchill v. Hunt, 3 Denio. 321; Wilson v. 
Stilwell, 9 Ohio 467; Redfield v. Haight, 27 Conn. 31. 
JO. Turner v. Howze, 28 Cal. App. 167, 170-71, 151 P. 751 (1915) (emphasis added): 
Such breach having occurred, the party not in default was enti tied to recover damages 
therefor. The measure of her damages is the amount of the indebtedness, and she 
may recover those damages without first paying the mortgage debt. We base this 
ruling upon the decision of the supreme court inMeyerv. Parsons, 129 Cal. 653, [62 
Pac. 216]. It was there held that where, upon sufficient consideration, the defendant 
agreed with the plaintiff to pay certain indebtedness of the plaintiff to creditors, that 
on a failure to keep that promise the plaintiff is entitled to recover whatever damages 
he has sustained by reason of such failure, and that the damages are the same 
whether he has already paid the creditors or must yet inevitably pay them. In 
the present case the debt which Howze agreed to pay was not an indebtedness of Mrs. 
Turner, but was in substance a debt of Howze for which the property of Mrs. Turner 
was given as security. There is no difference between this case and Meyer v. Parsons 
which can reasonably prevent that decision from being applicable in favor of the 
plaintiff here. 
11. Wrightv. Chapin, 87 Hun. 144, 33 N.Y.S. 1068, 1070-7l(N.Y. Gen. Term, 1895)(emphasis 
added) 
It thus appears that defendant purchased lands from plaintiff, and as consideration for 
such purchase agreed to pay Goodwin the debt that plaintiff owed Goodwin, and 
agreed to relieve plaintiff of and from all liability to said Goodwin. The defendant, 
therefore, has the plaintiffs property, and as the consideration of the conveyance of 
the property he agreed to pay a debt of plaintiffs to Goodwin, and to relieve plaintiff 
from the liability which he was under to Goodwin; and that covenant the defendant 
has failed to perform by failing to pay $22,429.38 of the said indebtedness of plaintiff 
to Goodwin. This covenant is not strictly a covenant for indemnity against loss, 
but an express covenant to do a particular act, namely, to pay Goodwin the 
money due him, and to relieve plaintiff from a liability to Goodwin; and the 
damage sustained by plaintiff by a breach of that covenant is the amount of the 
liability from plaintiff to Goodwin . .. 
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